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What’s the right amount of seed money to raise?
i really dislike super pro-rata rights. i had a discussion with another VC about that yesterday.
it's a really bad idea. i think i'll post about it
fred
Two sticking points, 1) acceleration for non-founders, 2) on the founders pay I agree but what happens when a startup goes years and several rounds before an acquistion. At some point ramen gets old and you want to prevent founders from leaving. Or do you believe startups should die before getting to that point?
Would like your thoughts on the above.
I hadn't thought about your second point. When I think about startups I know in that position either the founders have left or the companies are break even to mildly profitable and the founders are taking better salaries - which at that point seems fair. I guess you'd have to take it case by case...?
1) I don't you can ever do a deal where all the investors get is common stock. That is as dangerous a misalignment as any; the day after the closing, entrepreneurs could liquidate the company and pocket 2/3 of the financing.
2) I agree on subsistence-level (e.g. $40K) salaries for seed round deals, but once a company raises a real A (e.g. $3 million) or is profitable, you should pay something closer to market.
a) It's unfair to ask founders to essentially lose money for an extended period of time.
b) The below-market salaries will distort your view of the company's profitability
c) Founders who actually have families will be priced out of the startup game. I have 2 small children, which means for cash flow purposes, $40K isn't subsistence, it's a cash hemorrhage.
Don't get me wrong; subsistence salaries are great for seed stage deals, and I did the same when I was at Ustream, but it was always intended as a super short-term (3-6 months) situation.
Re: the ideal startup board, I think for early startups, it may not make sense to have two out of three directors who are not involved in daily operations. I completely agree that founders and team leaders who do crappy jobs do deserve to get fired but am more concerned about too much bureaucracy, politics, and chefs in the kitchen early on, when the startup needs to be dynamic and nimble.
Cheers,
Tai
I certainly hope so.
Any interest in a potential board member seat in a pre-corporate startup Chris? The initial thrust is in contextual advertising driven by user social media, with the user value point being 2-way personalized passive search (both real time and through standard search engines).
It's been challenging finding potential team members with zero dollars but it turns out relentless passion helps. I've got 2 web dev savy folks helping and a business strategy friend, an we're discussing the pattern matching/prediction problem with the ensemble winning Netflix team shortly (just gotta pick a good skype time)
A simple boiler plate template for most documents makes good sense.
I was planning on setting up a website for startups to access these boilerplate documents (not just capital raising but NDAs, Development/engagement contracts etc etc)
If you want to email any boilerplate documents you have the right to 'open source' to submission@NYalpha.com i'll add them to the library.
Cheers,
Dean
My guess is Chris doesn't work at "subsistence" levels. Neither should an entrepreneur. If you can work at subsistence levels, then you should reconsider funding.
Anything considerably less than market salary should result in increased founder vesting.
I have never seen the option pool taken out of the pre-money, and it doesn't make sense. These are used to recruit new executives down the road to increase the value of the company. These should not be dilutive only to the founders.
I really believe this stuff.
http://www.techstars.org/2009/02/07/techstars-m...
My only inputs are that I tend to think option pool vesting for founders and senior leadership team should all trigger on change of control, but that normal vesting should have a portion time based and a portion performance based. Having an additional vesting carrot hanging out there in year 2 or 3 for hitting revenue or EBITDA goals can be a great motivator for a management team.
Also I'm sure it varies by stage. I am thinking particularly at the seed stage, which is what I'm most familiar with. I'd expect at your stage you hire sales people etc at market cash comp prices and I expect that's the best strategy.
Shouldn't you also clarify what you mean by "employee"?
If we're talking about someone who has a significant equity stake (including options), subsistence salary makes sense. However, if we're talking about someone who has >1%, it's insane.
Let's do the math. Most of these companies will fail. Of the ones that don't, the vast majority will go for less than $100M. If the company "goes", that's $1M to our 1%er. Over five years, that's subsistence $200k/year. However, in most cases, it's $subsistence for five years. The expected value calculation is between those two end-points, but closer to subsistence than $200k.
There's a Dilbert about a company that thinks that it can find good engineers who can't compare salaries.
How many good engineers do you run into who won't do an expected value calculation?
1. Find a start-up lawyer, rather than a start-up law firm. Even at the firms Chris mentions, there are attorneys insensitive to start-up concerns. I practiced at Wilson Sonsini for 19.5 years before moving to Greenberg Traurig's Silicon Valley office. GT's Silicon Valley office has excellent start-up attorneys.
2. Cost. I believe that the quotes you will receive for Series A rounds will exceed Chris' estimate of $10K for both sides. However, there are ways to keep the fees modest. One way is to limit diligence and disclosures. If the company is a raw start-up, then there should not be much if any diligence. If the company has an operating history, has patents or applications, or has spun off from another company, then there may some form of diligence investigation. In life science transactions, it is typical for investors to do a "freedom to operate" analysis, which usually costs $5,000 by itself. Another way to limit costs is to make sure there is indeed an agreement at the term sheet level. Negotiating changes later in the process when the documents are largely completed adds to cost (just like change orders with a contractor; there will be additional fees).
3. Most US first through third tier venture capital funds will adhere to the basic terms Chris outlines. Foreign firms and angels usually have their own pet provisions, as do corporate investors. Expect deviations when not dealing with experienced U.S. venture funds.
Thanks for the comments. I'd generally agree with what you say. I'd definitely agree that the particular attorney matters more than the firm just as the particular VC does more than the VC firm.
On fees I agree I'm being aggressive (on the low side) but think it's doable, especially if you agree to "standardization" as Fred Wilson suggests.
I haven't done foreign deals - I expect your are right about that.
We recently had a discussion with another founder about the CEO compensation. I believe the right incentive is that the optimum is a mixture of fixed and variable. Fixed should be high enough so that they don't have to worry while the variable should be something around 20 to 30% and based upon specific goals for that period (usually one year). The variable should only come from the actual cash they were able to generate. Hence this is only reasonable when the startup is cash-flow positive. I believe success on the way should be rewarded.
Interested to hear your opinion on that.
It seems kind of unfair to me that an investor / VC can oust a founder, despite owning less than 50% of the company per say...
The only point of disagreement that I'd have with what has been presented is on founder comp. As it looks like I'm in the significant minority here, I'll just make the quick point and move on.
It's been my experience, over the past 18 years or so of investing in deals (and bringing in investments as well), that you get what you pay for, and the management team (particularly in a start up) is critical to the success of a venture. If you cap what you're willing to pay arbitrarily, then you're either investing in the wrong company, are investing in a company whose founder isn't necessarily critical to success, or setting a criteria that could lead to you not participating in a great deal.
I've personally seen few deals that the valuation (if the company was successful) was more important than the key people driving the company.
Maybe put another way, if an entrepreneur and/or his venture is so tenuous that he's willing to pursue it while eating Ramen, then maybe it might not be the right deal.... I don't know of too many of us in the VC community eating Ramen until we've hit our return hurdle to our investors...
Just some food (hopefully not Ramen) for thought...
--matt
Founders and entrepreneurs and startup staff -- and venture firm staff -- are compensated with a mix of cash and vesting equity -- why should the portfolio company human costs be viewed any differently than the funds overheads?
As I like to remind my many VC friends -- the person who is incompetent when negotiating with you for funding is likely to be incompetent negotiating with everyone else, too.
The best way to standardize term sheets AND control legal costs would be to have VC pay their own legal bills
Its a bit unfair to view attorneys as the principal factor driving up legal costs -- having done a large nunber of delas, I can say the main reason legal costs balloon is that every VC in every deal expects to be able to have their own law firms review every word. And these law firms are under no pressure to keep it lean and mean -- they are not being paid by their clients (the VC firms) but rather by their clients opponent sitting across the table!
Imagine if VCs had to pay their own legal bills (and, um, isn't that what management fees were supposed to be for?) deals would quickly be near-standardized and attorneys would be under tremendous pressure to make it neat clean and fast (after all, a tsratup is a short term, small file client, but a VC firm can be a longterm, cash cow for a law firm.)
Even better, all that portfolio company funding money would (drum roll please) actually go to work in the portfolio company, and not to give VCs compensation raises (by freeing up management fees to pay bigger salaries.)
I know, I know. It's a crazy fantasy. But a guy's got to dream, doesn't he?
I apologize for perhaps not having been clear enough in the articulation of my view.
I'm not saying that an entrepreneur being willing to eat Ramen precludes the deal being of potential value.
I'm saying that in all the deals that I've done (good, bad, and indifferent) I've never seen a correlation between the value of the investment and what the founder is eating. The compensation to the founder needs to be FAIR and appropriate, and I don't think that arbitrarily setting this at some subsistence level is going to result in a better return profile for the fund and is more likely to deselect opportunities that could represent good return potential for the fund (as would ANY arbitrary parameter).
Put another way, as someone that has participated in a number of funds as an LP, the other standard terms that were presented in this excellent outline were thoughtful, articulate, and drive value. Were a fund manager to approach me as a prospective LP and tell me that one of their standard deal terms was that they would require a subsistence compensation plan to the founders of the company in which they'd invest, I'd show them the door. This, in my mind, would be akin to screening prospective deals out of a pipeline because prior investors had received too high a return in an up-round. I've seen this happen and have asked the same types of questions when these situations arise - "where in my financial return profile does what others have made prior to my investment show up?"
To make what Chris has put together (which is already extremely good) something great - I'd simply move founder comp to the "to be negotiated" column and move on.
Brad Parker
co-Founder
www.muzlink.com
One challenge is that this expected value changes every day, and you risk losing a key employee due to the natural gyrations of this number. I've lost good engineers in dark times, only to have things improve the next month. Paying more than subsistence gives you a bit of a buffer when a key engineer gets a call from a recruiter.
Is it acceptable and what should be a fair ratio ?
Priceless post Christ, thanks for sharing your experience.
Best's
I'd be curious which protections you think are important and missing.
I agree with the idea the that founders should be getting wealthy with customer dollars not investor dollars. That being said, my time is more valuable than your money. I can never get more time in my life. I must be able to recoup all my invested time and savings. My family's financial well-being depends on this. My extended family is poor and would not be able to help if my family suffered any major financial setback ( disability or death). Any investment offer that does not recognize these fundamental realities is not worth taking.